Syria’s Contested Digital Sovereignty: Technology Agreements and Techno-Political Rivalry in Syria’s Reconstruction 2024–2025


Arslan A. C.

Post-Conflict Rebuilding in Syria Symposium, İstanbul, Türkiye, 29 - 30 Kasım 2025, ss.1-20, (Tam Metin Bildiri)

  • Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
  • Basıldığı Şehir: İstanbul
  • Basıldığı Ülke: Türkiye
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.1-20
  • Polis Akademisi Adresli: Evet

Özet

Between December 2024 and September 2025, the Syrian government’s digital infrastructure agenda has been marked by a series of agreements that highlight the fragile balance between digital sovereignty and external dependency in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction. Negotiations over the $300 million SilkLink project with Zain, e& (Etisalat), stc, and Ooredoo have strengthened Syria’s ambition to position itself as a terrestrial corridor in Asia-Europe data traffic. In addition, the BarqNet/FTTP plan and the consultancy agreement signed with Arthur D. Little for the design of tenders indicate a convergence toward international standards in project evaluation and PPP models. In 2025, the Memorandum of Understanding with Saudi Arabia’s Salam for establishing international IP PoPs (internet protocol point of presence) in Damascus and Aleppo signaled the potential to enhance Syria’s direct access to global Tier-1 connections. Meanwhile, Nokia’s return to Syria has opened the door for reintroducing European standards in equipment provision and knowledge transfer, particularly in cybersecurity and supply chain transparency. This landscape confirms the rising role of Gulf capital and technology providers (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE), while also necessitating caution regarding the continuing influence of Iran-linked actors (such as the ownership structure of the third operator, Wafa Telecom). The paper analyzes these agreements across three policy axes: i) standards and cybersecurity (European/Gulf frameworks vs. alternative supply chains), ii) data governance and localization (the role of PoPs in defining data sovereignty), and iii) dependency risks (long-term maintenance, upgrades, and financing conditions). Drawing on official statements, industry reports, and international news sources, the study underscores the necessity of strategic diversification and risk mitigation in ensuring Syria’s digital sovereignty during reconstruction.

Keywords: Digital Sovereignty, Reconstruction, Techno-Politics, Conflict Management